Britain's satellites depend on ground stations moving to the cloud as cybersecurity maturity lags behind critical infrastructure needs
Government study reveals security gaps as space industry adopts shared platforms for controlling essential services
Your morning begins with a glance at your phone's weather app. You follow GPS directions to work, perhaps calling emergency services about an accident en route. Each action depends on satellites hundreds of miles overhead—and on ground stations you've never heard of that are quietly undergoing a transformation that could leave critical services vulnerable to cyber attack.
Britain's satellite infrastructure is moving to the cloud. The shift promises greater efficiency and lower costs, but a comprehensive government study reveals a troubling reality: the space sector's cybersecurity maturity isn't keeping pace with its technological ambitions. As ground stations that control essential satellites migrate to shared cloud platforms, new vulnerabilities are emerging in infrastructure that modern life cannot do without.
The hidden network controlling space
Ground stations are the terrestrial nerve centres that command satellites, uploading instructions and downloading data. For decades, these facilities operated in isolation—standalone, often air-gapped installations serving individual satellite missions. That world is disappearing.
Commercial providers now offer Ground Station as a Service, allowing multiple satellite operators to share global networks through cloud platforms. Amazon Web Services, Google, and established providers like KSAT share antenna time across customers, dramatically reducing costs whilst providing worldwide coverage that individual operators could never afford.
The transformation makes economic sense. Building and maintaining ground infrastructure requires enormous capital investment. Shared services eliminate those costs whilst enabling seamless handovers between stations worldwide as satellites orbit overhead. For the growing number of small satellite operators, GSaaS provides access to sophisticated infrastructure that would otherwise remain prohibitively expensive.
Yet this efficiency comes with consequences that extend far beyond the space industry.
When obscurity no longer protects
The space sector has long relied on "security through obscurity"—the assumption that specialised systems remain inherently protected from cyber threats. Ground stations connected only to internal networks within trusted organisations. Many facilities were partially air-gapped, limiting external access that might expose vulnerabilities.
The government study, conducted by the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology through interviews with 25 organisations, found this approach crumbling. Commercial space operations, small satellite constellations, and shared ground infrastructure have made space systems accessible and interconnected in ways that traditional security models never anticipated.
Cloud integration can enhance security through better access controls and monitoring—but only if implemented correctly. Major cloud providers invest heavily in cybersecurity, often exceeding the capabilities of legacy ground systems. However, the same integration expands attack surfaces by creating multiple interfaces that adversaries can target.
The critical factor is implementation quality, and here the study reveals concerning gaps. Stakeholders acknowledged that the space sector has begun improving cybersecurity practices only within the last three to four years, evolving from what researchers described as "a low base." In an industry where cybersecurity maturity remains limited, the benefits of cloud computing aren't guaranteed.
Critical services at stake
The vulnerabilities matter because satellites underpin critical national infrastructure in ways most people never consider. Every transport mode relies on satellite-based navigation. Ships crossing oceans, aircraft following flight paths, emergency vehicles responding to disasters—all depend on signals from satellites controlled through ground stations.
Emergency services use satellite communications as primary or backup systems. Weather forecasting that informs everything from flight schedules to flood warnings depends on satellite data. Telecommunications networks rely on satellite links for redundancy and coverage in remote areas.
This interconnection creates systemic risk. Unlike traditional cyber attacks targeting individual organisations, successful attacks on shared ground infrastructure could cascade across multiple essential services simultaneously. A compromised ground station provider managing communications for weather satellites might disrupt both aviation safety systems and disaster response capabilities.
The government research found specific technical vulnerabilities amplifying these risks. Many satellite communications lack end-to-end encryption. Others transmit unencrypted data despite available authentication improvements. The study noted that "encryption of command and telemetry data remains inconsistent, with many organisations still transmitting unencrypted data."
New adversaries, amplified threats
The shift to cloud-based operations has attracted threat actors with capabilities and motivations that traditional space security models never anticipated. The government study identified external attackers targeting internet-facing interfaces, malicious ground station operators exploiting legitimate access, and nation-state actors focusing on supply chain vulnerabilities.
Nation-states represent the most significant threat. Unlike cybercriminals motivated by financial gain, state actors target space systems for intelligence gathering, infrastructure disruption, and strategic advantage. The complexity of cloud infrastructure makes it difficult for satellite operators to verify whether security requirements are being met by third-party providers.
Supply chain risks have become particularly acute. Satellite operators lose visibility into how ground station providers implement security controls, yet missions depend entirely on these providers. The study found that basic protections like cryptographic verification of software libraries remain "not widely adopted," leaving the software supply chain vulnerable to compromise.
Advanced persistent threats continuously monitor space-ground communications for exploitable vulnerabilities. Whilst most reported incidents have targeted traditional infrastructures, cloud adoption introduces new attack vectors and exploitation techniques that adversaries are adapting to target.
Regulatory vacuum
Despite satellites supporting critical national infrastructure, no dedicated regulatory framework governs ground station security in the UK. The Civil Aviation Authority licenses satellite operations and may assess cybersecurity risks, but lacks direct authority over ground station providers—particularly those based abroad.
This creates accountability gaps in infrastructure supporting essential services. The CAA can impose licensing conditions influencing cybersecurity practices, but enforcement becomes complex when ground infrastructure spans multiple jurisdictions under different regulatory frameworks.
Ofcom regulates radio spectrum but not spaceflight activities. The UK Space Agency is developing voluntary cybersecurity standards with bronze, silver, and gold assurance levels. Industry stakeholders have welcomed this flexible approach, but voluntary frameworks may prove insufficient for infrastructure underpinning critical national services.
International coordination remains fragmented. The global nature of satellite operations requires harmonised regulatory approaches, but the lack of standardised security frameworks across countries creates compliance challenges for providers serving multiple markets.
Technology risks and implementation challenges
Space systems are cyber-physical systems where ground commands directly control satellite hardware. Real-time interactions mean cyber threats can cause physical damage or operational disruption. Timing attacks and command injection become particularly dangerous during launches and other time-sensitive operations.
Different cloud integration models present varying risk profiles. Legacy approaches maintaining on-premise operations with cloud scheduling offer limited attack surfaces but require high trust between providers and customers. API-access models provide better customer separation but expose additional interfaces to potential attack. Full cloud models maximise efficiency but significantly increase dependence on cloud infrastructure requiring strict access controls.
The shared responsibility model complicates security implementation. Cloud providers secure infrastructure whilst customers must protect applications, data, and access controls. When responsibilities aren't clearly understood, accountability gaps emerge that attackers can exploit.
Many legacy satellite systems lack end-to-end security mechanisms, creating vulnerabilities that persist regardless of ground infrastructure improvements. Integrating older systems with cloud-based services requires careful consideration to avoid exposing outdated interfaces and insecure protocols.
Industry response and government support
The space sector encompasses established players with robust security practices and newer entrants lacking necessary expertise and resources. Larger organisations, including major cloud providers and traditional aerospace companies, maintain stronger security often driven by military and government requirements. Smaller operators frequently prioritise business expansion over cybersecurity investment.
Stakeholders interviewed for the government study favoured building upon existing security frameworks rather than creating new requirements. Participants supported leveraging established standards from NIST and the European Space Agency rather than developing space-specific regulations that might stifle innovation.
The study found broad agreement that government support should focus on enabling smaller organisations through voluntary certification schemes, funding for security training, and collaborative frameworks helping companies adopt security controls without excessive administrative burdens.
International collaboration emerged as essential given the global nature of satellite operations, but current approaches lack the coordination necessary to address transnational threats effectively.
The path forward
Cloud technology offers genuine benefits for space operations through improved efficiency, scalability, and potentially enhanced security. Hybrid architectures combining multiple ground station providers can increase resilience whilst reducing single points of failure. However, realising these benefits requires addressing fundamental gaps in cybersecurity maturity and regulatory oversight.
The government study makes clear that rapid commercial growth and technological evolution have outpaced security framework development. Strong authentication, access controls, and customer separation are essential for securing cloud-integrated space systems, but implementation quality determines whether these measures enhance or undermine overall security.
End-to-end encryption between satellites and operators can reduce vulnerabilities at ground stations, but many legacy systems lack these capabilities. Integrating older satellites with modern ground infrastructure creates technical challenges that the industry is still learning to navigate.
Securing essential infrastructure
Britain's satellite infrastructure supports everything from emergency response to economic activity, yet the ground systems controlling these satellites are undergoing a transformation that introduces new vulnerabilities alongside operational benefits. The space sector's historically low cybersecurity maturity combined with complex cloud integration challenges creates risks that extend far beyond the industry itself.
Success requires coordinated action among government, industry, and international partners to develop robust security standards whilst fostering innovation. The cloud offers genuine advantages for space operations, but only if the industry develops the cybersecurity capabilities necessary to implement these technologies securely.
The stakes are too high for anything less. Modern life depends on satellites, and satellites depend on ground infrastructure that must be protected against evolving threats. The final frontier may be infinite, but the terrestrial systems that provide access to it require focused protection that matches their critical importance to national infrastructure and daily life.