Nearly Right

The Soviet playbook returns

How oligarch tactics reached American space policy

The morning when Pentagon officials quietly announced the end of a 40-year partnership, thousands of satellites orbiting overhead suddenly became invisible to the very people trying to protect them from collision. Peak hurricane season. Space traffic at record density. America's most sophisticated early warning systems going dark.

The decision to terminate satellite weather data sharing came without warning in late June, catching hurricane forecasters and satellite operators off guard. Within weeks, a second blow followed: the proposed elimination of TraCSS, the collision-prevention program that costs roughly three SpaceX launches annually. Together, these moves represent the largest peacetime reduction of space and weather surveillance capability in American history.

Yet the timing reveals calculation rather than coincidence. Both eliminations follow detailed blueprints laid out in Project 2025, the conservative policy document that explicitly calls for dismantling the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration as "one of the main drivers of the climate change alarm industry." What appears to be budget cutting is actually infrastructure capture—a deliberate strategy to transfer public oversight capabilities to private control.

The forty-year partnership ends

Since the 1970s, the Department of Defense has operated satellites collecting crucial atmospheric and oceanic data. The Navy's Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center processed this information and shared it freely with scientists and weather forecasters worldwide. This arrangement provided hurricane researchers like Brian Tang at the University at Albany with real-time storm structure data—"sort of like an MRI or X-ray" of developing hurricanes.

The data allowed forecasters to detect when new eyewalls formed, indicating rapid intensification that could catch coastal communities unprepared. During Hurricane Erick earlier this month, forecasters used Defense Department satellite data to observe a circular eyewall forming, providing early warning that the storm would intensify much faster than computer models predicted. The storm hit Mexico as a destructive Category 3 hurricane.

Now that capability is vanishing. Navy officials cite "cybersecurity concerns" and "information technology modernization requirements" but refuse to specify what those concerns might be. The explanation rings hollow when satellite positions remain publicly trackable—amateur astronomers routinely locate classified satellites using basic equipment.

More revealing is what remains operational. The satellites continue functioning, the Defense Department continues using the data internally, and the infrastructure for sharing remains intact. Only the sharing itself stops. This suggests the real goal isn't security but control—maintaining government-subsidised data collection whilst eliminating public access.

When even beneficiaries object

The pattern becomes clearer when examining who supports these changes: virtually nobody. Even AccuWeather, the private weather company that spent decades lobbying to restrict government forecasting, opposes full elimination of public weather services. In a remarkable statement, the company declared that "the American public and economy are best served when all entities provide their expertise, capabilities, and contributions to the common goal."

This represents an extraordinary reversal. For years, AccuWeather's former CEO Barry Myers led efforts to privatise weather forecasting. He supported the 2005 Santorum bill that would have prevented government agencies from providing services competing with private companies. Myers spent over $400,000 lobbying Congress to limit public weather services, arguing that taxpayer-funded forecasts undermined private sector innovation.

When Trump nominated Myers to lead NOAA in 2017, the appointment stalled for two years due to conflicts of interest and sexual harassment scandals at AccuWeather. Myers eventually withdrew, but the ideology persisted. Now Trump has nominated Neil Jacobs, an atmospheric scientist previously found to have violated NOAA's scientific integrity policies during the "Sharpiegate" incident of 2019.

That scandal revealed systematic political interference when Trump pressured NOAA to contradict its own meteorologists' accurate Hurricane Dorian forecasts. An inspector general investigation found that Commerce Department officials, following White House orders, forced NOAA to issue an unsigned statement criticising forecasters who correctly predicted Alabama would not be affected by the storm. The incident damaged NOAA's reputation for issuing apolitical guidance and eroded public trust in an agency tasked with protecting life and property.

The Project 2025 blueprint emerges

The current eliminations follow this script precisely. The Heritage Foundation's 922-page blueprint explicitly calls for NOAA to be "broken up and downsized," with the National Weather Service "fully commercialising its forecasting operations." Climate research faces particular attack as "harmful to future U.S. prosperity," with functions moved elsewhere, privatised, or eliminated entirely.

The strategy reveals sophisticated understanding of bureaucratic capture. Rather than direct privatisation—which would require Congressional approval and public debate—the approach systematically defunds operational capabilities whilst maintaining expensive infrastructure. This creates distressed assets perfect for below-market acquisition by well-positioned buyers.

The economic logic becomes clear when considering infrastructure value rather than service revenue. Government weather satellites cost billions to design, launch, and maintain. By eliminating data sharing whilst keeping satellites operational, policymakers create artificial scarcity that private companies can exploit without bearing infrastructure costs.

Meanwhile, satellite tracking presents similar opportunities. The TraCSS program protects satellites worth hundreds of billions whilst costing roughly three SpaceX launches annually. The 2009 collision between Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 created over 1,800 pieces of trackable debris that threaten operations fifteen years later. Even small collision risks justify substantial prevention spending.

Yet the program faces elimination precisely when satellite traffic reaches critical density. Nearly 12,000 satellites now orbit Earth, compared to fewer than 5,000 when Trump first took office. Starlink alone operates over 7,000 satellites, performing approximately 275 collision avoidance manoeuvres daily. The risk of catastrophic collision increases exponentially with satellite density, not linearly.

Following the oligarch playbook

This pattern matches wealth extraction strategies pioneered during the Soviet collapse: defund state capabilities during political chaos, demonstrate government failure, then transfer valuable assets to connected buyers at distressed prices. The process requires coordination between policy implementation and capital positioning.

Evidence suggests such coordination exists. The Heritage Foundation, which produced Project 2025, maintains extensive connections to private weather and space companies. Several Project 2025 authors held positions in Trump's first administration and maintain relationships with industry executives positioned to benefit from public asset transfers.

The timing maximises leverage. Eliminating weather data during peak hurricane season demonstrates government "unreliability" whilst creating pressure on private alternatives. Ending satellite tracking as space traffic reaches dangerous levels ensures maximum disruption that can later justify emergency privatisation measures.

International competitors benefit enormously. European and Chinese space agencies provide comprehensive tracking services that their domestic companies access freely. By forcing American firms to purchase inferior private alternatives whilst competitors access superior government data, these policies guarantee strategic subordination in critical technologies.

This represents voluntary transfer of technological authority to foreign competitors. As U.S. monitoring capabilities degrade, international partners will naturally shift dependency to European, Chinese, or other alternatives. The result is systematic loss of soft power and intelligence-sharing opportunities that took decades to build.

What China sees that America won't

The broader implications extend beyond weather and satellites to fundamental questions of governmental competence. Eliminating oversight infrastructure serves multiple strategic goals: it prevents independent verification of climate trends, removes checks on both natural threats and political narratives, and creates information monopolies controllable by political authority.

Without continuous satellite monitoring, long-term climate trends become undetectable, enabling arguments that observed changes represent natural variation rather than systematic warming. Without independent weather data, emergency responses depend entirely on politically controlled sources. Without space tracking, collision risks become unmanageable whilst responsibility shifts to private entities with profit motivives during crises.

The cascade effects multiply geometrically. Extreme weather increasingly threatens ground-based monitoring infrastructure precisely when satellite-based alternatives face deliberate degradation. Each satellite collision creates debris threatening other satellites in cascade effects. Military systems face increased burden for civilian monitoring precisely when they need focus on strategic threats.

China recognises these vulnerabilities and exploits them ruthlessly. Chinese space and weather agencies expand international partnerships whilst American capabilities contract. Chinese companies gain competitive advantages as American firms face restricted data access. Most critically, Chinese strategic planning incorporates American oversight degradation as a predictable factor in future competitions.

The consequences are already visible. International maritime operations increasingly rely on European rather than American weather data. Commercial satellite operators explore foreign alternatives to American tracking services. Military allies develop independent capabilities rather than depend on degraded American systems.

The irony cuts deep: in pursuing ideological purity about government overreach, America hands strategic advantages to authoritarian competitors who suffer no such qualms about state capability. Beijing watches American infrastructure degradation with satisfaction, knowing each eliminated program represents transferred influence they need not fight to acquire.

Yet reversal remains possible if Americans recognise infrastructure capture before permanent damage occurs. The satellites still function, the technical expertise remains intact, and the institutional knowledge persists. What's required is political recognition that surveillance infrastructure represents strategic assets worth protecting rather than burdens requiring elimination.

The choice is stark: restore public oversight capabilities whilst infrastructure remains intact, or accept permanent technological subordination to competitors who understand the value of seeing disasters before they strike. The satellites overhead continue their vigil. Whether America chooses to watch depends on decisions made in the coming months.

The storm clouds are gathering, both literally and figuratively. The question is whether America will choose to see them coming.

#aerospace #politics